Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Weisberg/Needham/Hendry, Jackson/Pargetter/Prior and Allan Gibbard

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26 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17472 Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17471 Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7435 Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
17465 Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
17468 Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17469 'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17470 Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17473 It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17474 Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
17475 For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17467 Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17466 Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]